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
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IN THIS ISSUE .

The recent awarding of the Nobel Literature Prize to Albert Camus makes this issue's lead article by Robert G. Collmer particularly timely. Dr. Collmer, Professor of English at Hardin-Simmons University, steps out of his main field of specialization to write on Camus as an example of the theme of alienation in modern letters. His special interests have been in English and Continental literature of the later Renaissance; his Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania) was on "The Concept of Death in the Poetry of Donne, Herbert, Crashaw, and Vaughan," and his articles have appeared in *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, *Notes and Queries*, and *The Explicator*.

Born in Central America, the son of missionary parents, Dr. Collmer received his B.A. and M.A. from Baylor University. He taught at the University of Pennsylvania and Philadelphia Bible Institute before coming to Hardin-Simmons in 1954. He is a member of the Modern Language Association, South-Central Modern Language Association, Renaissance Society of America, and Conference on Christianity and Literature.

Over the last two years *The Gordon Review* has published several articles seeking to explore the relationship between theology and linguistics, especially the modern developments in the theory of language. In this issue two scholars present a symposium on this subject, one of the most challenging to contemporary Christian thinkers.

The work of Gordon H. Clark has appeared before in these pages ("Logic and Language," February, 1956; "Cosmic Time," September, 1956). He is Professor of Philosophy at Butler University. His latest books are *A Christian View of Men and Things* (1952), *What Presbyterians Believe* (1956), and *Thales to Dewey* (1957). (See further "Personalalia," February, 1956, p. 33.)

Eugene A. Nida is a practicing linguist whose textbook *Morphology* was published by the University of Michigan Press in 1949 and who has made special studies in the Amerindian and African languages. He is editor of *The Bible Translator*, associate editor of *Practical Anthropology*, and the author of *God's Word in Man's Language* (1952) and *Customs and Cultures* (1954).

Dr. Nida received his B.A. from the University of California at Los Angeles; M.A. from the University of Southern California; and Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. As a Secretary of the American Bible Society he heads the Translations Department. He is also Professor of Linguistics at the University of Oklahoma's Summer Institute of Linguistics.

THE ALIENATION OF MAN IN CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE

A STUDY OF ALBERT CAMUS

ROBERT G. COLLMER

Future historians of the literature of the mid-twentieth century will probably discover one predominant motif in our writings: the literary man's consciousness of alienation from nature, society, and God. Contemporary poets and novelists proclaim that the Western World has lost not only the unity of the famed Medieval Synthesis but also the semblance of unity of nineteenth-century progressivism. Despair and distrust have displaced buoyance and confidence. The note of pessimism appearing in T. S. Eliot's *The Waste Land* and W. H. Auden's *The Age of Anxiety* has increased, especially since the Second World War, to drown out most pleas of amelioration of society, even the voice of the staunch progressivist H. G. Wells, who terminated his writing career with that remarkable, little-known book *Mind at the End of Its Tether*.

Some of the most vigorous writing dealing with this awareness of alienation has been produced in France. And some of the best of the kind has come from Albert Camus, whose staccato style telling of the isolation of the contemporary man in an alien world has guaranteed him a hearing both in Europe and in America. I believe that if we analyze Camus' works, we discover the flow of recent thought of the Western World. I also believe that Camus presents some startling tendencies, of peculiar interest to the Christian observer.

Though Camus is widely known on the Continent and especially in connection with the group of writers labeled "existentialists" who have Jean-Paul Sartre as the godparent (Camus, incidentally, refuses to be classed as an "existentialist") and according to some critics has taken Thomas Mann's place as the foremost literary man of Europe, he is only now beginning to command wide attention in America. A few details of his life, therefore, might be necessary. Born in 1913 in North Africa, he spent his childhood in Algiers in great poverty. A teacher, recognizing his potential, helped him obtain a state scholarship which enabled him to enter the Lycée and later the University of Algiers. He was prevented from pursuing his plan to become a teacher by an attack of tuberculosis. When he recovered, he worked at odd jobs in France and North Africa. He became an outstanding member of the Resistance during the German occupation of France. He edited the underground newspaper *Combat*, beginning in 1944. In recent years he has devoted his time to writing philosophical articles, plays, and novels.

Camus' best-known works are the following: *The Stranger* (1942), *The Myth of Sisyphus* (1942), *The Plague* (1947), *The Rebel* (1951), and *The Fall* (1956). *The Stranger*, *The Plague*, and *The Fall* are novels; the first two are set in North Africa, the last in Holland. *The Myth of Sisyphus* is an extended essay dealing with the problem of whether suicide is justifiable. *The Rebel* is a long philosophical treatise dealing with the theme of man in revolt against a meaningless universe. My approach to these works will be to outline the stories of the three novels and discuss the significant ideas of each; as the necessity arises, I shall also introduce some of the material from the essays; ultimately I wish to draw a conclusion about Camus' philosophy in relation to Christianity.

Basic for an understanding of Camus' thought is the recognition that he is concerned to show the movement of the human being from thinghood to full existence. Philip Hallie has set forth the steps in this movement as, first, rock-like somnolence; second, shock or crisis during which the "absurdity" of the world around us becomes clear and inescapable; third, the free choice of a reaction or attitude toward this absurdity; fourth, the use of our freedom to act—we do something about this absurdity.¹ Camus is, in other words, portraying creatively the movement from what Sartre calls "the existence of the rock, the consistency, the inertia, the opaqueness of the being-in-the-midst-of-the-world"² to what Mrs. Marjorie Grene has called "dreadful freedom."³

The Stranger, the first of Camus' novels, tells the story of one Meursault, a man about thirty who commits a murder. Set in the background of North Africa, the story parallels the limitless sun, sand, and beach of the country with the expressionless, amoral life of Meursault. All moves in a linear direction for Meursault, whether it be the death of his mother (whom he has put into a poor home), the liaison with his girlfriend, or the murder of an Arab. Expressive of this vegetative thinghood is the following description of Meursault's killing of the Arab:

Nobody made a move yet; it was just as if everything had closed in on us so that we couldn't stir. We could only watch each other, never lowering our eyes; the whole world seemed to have come to a standstill on this little strip of sand between the sunlight and the sea, the twofold silence of the reed and stream. And just then it crossed my mind that one might fire, or not fire—and it would come to absolutely the same thing.⁴

Taken to prison, Meursault's trial consists of a piling up of evidence that, instead of his being a mild-mannered, basically harmless person, he is really

1. "Camus and the Literature of Revolt," *College English*, XVI (October, 1954), 26.
2. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existential Psychoanalysis*, tr. Hazel E. Barnes (New York, 1953), p. 104.
3. The term "dreadful freedom" comes from the title of Mrs. Grene's book *Dreadful Freedom: A Critique of Existentialism* (Chicago, 1948). She gives a definition of the concept of "dreadful freedom" on page 53 of her book.
4. *The Stranger*, tr. Stuart Gilbert (New York, 1953), p. 72.

a fiend who has ejected heartlessly his old, sick mother, has maintained a mistress, and has carried out a brutal murder. Meursault's "conversion," that is, his realization of the absurdity of the world, comes after the prison chaplain has attempted to bring him to acknowledge the presence of God.

I'd taken him by the neckband of his cassock, and, in a sort of ecstasy of joy and rage, I poured out on him all the thoughts that had been simmering in my brain. He seemed so cocksure, you see. And yet none of his certainties was worth one strand of a woman's hair. Living as he did, like a corpse, he couldn't even be sure of being alive. It might look as if my hands were empty. Actually, I was sure of myself, sure about everything, far surer than he; sure of my present life and of the death that was coming. That, no doubt, was all I had; but at least that certainty was something I could get my teeth into — just as it had got its teeth into me. I'd been right, I was still right, I was always right. I'd passed my life in a certain way, and I might have passed it in a different way, if I'd felt like it. I'd acted thus, and I hadn't acted otherwise; I hadn't done *x*, whereas I had done *y* or *z*. And what did that mean? That, all the time, I'd been waiting for this present moment, for that dawn, tomorrow's or another day's, which was to justify me. Nothing, nothing had the least importance.⁵

After this denunciation Meursault "felt ready to start life all over again. It was as if that great rush of anger had washed me clean, emptied me of hope, and, gazing up at the dark sky spangled with its signs and stars, for the first time, the first, I laid my heart open to the benign indifference of the universe."⁶ Camus is depicting by these actions of Meursault what the American philosopher Helmut Kuhn has called "the encounter with nothingness,"⁷ or what Dostoyevsky made Ivan Karamazov discover: "The world stands on absurdities, and perhaps nothing would have come to pass in it without them."⁸

The second novel, *The Plague*, can be treated more rapidly once the pattern of Camus' thought is recognized. This novel, set in the North African city of Oran, depicts the changes occurring when an epidemic of bubonic plague erupts. Before the plague appears, Camus describes the town as "treeless, glamourless, soulless, . . . ends by seeming restful and, after a while, you go complacently to sleep there."⁹ But when the incurable disease strikes, all is changed. Men come face to face with unpredictable death, unfeeling nature. The priest, Father Paneloux, describes the plague as a "huge wooden bar whirling above the town, striking at random, swinging up again in a shower of drops of blood, and spreading carnage and suffering on earth."¹⁰ The plague comes without explanation and leaves

5. *The Stranger*, pp. 151, 152.

6. *The Stranger*, p. 154.

7. The term comes from the title of Professor Kuhn's book *Encounter with Nothingness* (Hinsdale, Ill., 1949). He gives a definition of the concept of the "encounter with nothingness" on page 7 of his book.

8. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, tr. Constance Garnett (New York, n.d.), p. 252.

9. *The Plague*, tr. Stuart Gilbert (New York, 1957), p. 5.

10. *The Plague*, p. 89.

equally mysteriously. The hero of the novel, the physician Bernard Rieux, refusing to grovel before the oppressive and absurd universe (symbolized by the plague itself), fights back by attempting to save as many lives as possible. He has come to realize what Heidegger said—that all life is a *Sein-zum-Tode*; he achieves what Heidegger commends—that a man must be “self-resolved-in-face-of-death.”¹¹ In his assertion of human dignity and rightness amid an alien, unjust world, Rieux demonstrates what Camus felt in 1947 was the path to salvation, namely, that the man-God passes through the knowledge of the absurdity of the world, rebels against the injustice of the world, and (as Camus says in *The Rebel*) tries to “rectify in creation everything that can be rectified.”¹²

For our particular interests *The Fall* is the most rewarding of Camus' novels. Any novel whose main character (in fact, only character, since the work is a monologue) bears the name “Jean-Baptiste Clamence” is fascinating for students with a biblical knowledge. And a book by a leading philosophical writer in which, as *Harper's Magazine* criticizes, “there is scarcely anything . . . of the shocking state of modern man that you could not have heard from a moderately well supplied Middle Western pulpit thirty years ago” may “disappoint readers” (again *Harper's*) but might appeal to the Christian.¹³

Told by a formerly successful Parisian lawyer now living in shady circumstances in Amsterdam, the story is a recapitulation of the steps that led from self-assured affluence to despairing poverty. Again, as in the other two novels by Camus, a man is shocked out of his stonelike life to come to recognize the absurdity of the world. But in contrast to the other novels, his consciousness of absurdity does not result from the immanence of death and the paradox of the human being who wishes to be immortal suddenly dead. Here is no outside force. Jean-Baptiste simply has been walking in the Paris streets, crosses a bridge, and is taken by surprise to hear a “laugh burst out behind me.”¹⁴ The laugh seems to be the other side of Jean-Baptiste's personality developing—a side that makes him aware of the futility of life but offers no stimulus for courage or hope. The laugh is interpreted as telling Jean-Baptiste that he has a “double face,” is a “charming Janus,” and should have his calling cards engraved “Jean-Baptiste Clamence, play actor.”

Here is a significant different in Camus' thoughts from 1942 to 1956. In 1942 in the essay *The Myth of Sisyphus* he offered a “lucid invitation to

11. Grene, *Dreadful Freedom*, p. 71.

12. *The Rebel*, tr. Anthony Bower (New York, 1954), p. 270.

13. “The New Books,” *Harper's Magazine*, CCXIV (March, 1957), 96.

14. *The Fall*, tr. Justin O'Brien (New York, 1957), p. 39.

live and to create, in the very midst of the desert.”¹⁵ Without eternal verities, Camus pleaded for man’s virility to assert itself against the absurd creation. Man, according to the earlier view, was symbolized by the myth of Sisyphus, in which the eternal and fruitless activity of Sisyphus was to roll a stone up a steep hill, only to have the stone roll down again, and then to pursue the cycle endlessly. In 1956, Camus finds man not able to continue rolling his stone but admitting, with Jean-Baptiste, “what I am, having taken refuge in a desert of stones, fogs, and stagnant waters—an empty prophet for shabby times, Elijah without a messiah, choked with fever and alcohol, my back up against this moldy door, my finger raised toward a threatening sky, showering imprecations on lawless men who cannot endure any judgment.”¹⁶

Outside of avowed Christian literature no such self-deprecation could be found. Over and over again Camus refers to Jean-Baptiste as a judge-penitent, which is his peculiar term for the person who, conscious of his own guilt, craves forgiveness, yet gains none; he must go on endlessly judging and punishing himself. He is not a righteous man in an unrighteous universe; he is guilty. “Moreover, we cannot assert the innocence of anyone, whereas we can state with certainty the guilt of all. Every man testifies to the crime of all the others—that is my faith and my hope,” so says Jean-Baptiste.¹⁷

Instead of the Sisyphus symbol, Camus substitutes another symbol. Jean-Baptiste relates that, after he recognized the falseness of life through the medium of the unexplained laugh, “I had to submit and admit my guilt. I had to live in the little-ease. To be sure, you are not familiar with that dungeon cell that was called the little-ease in the Middle Ages. In general, one was forgotten there for life. That cell was distinguished from others by ingenious dimensions. It was not high enough to stand up in nor yet wide enough to lie down in. One had to take on an awkward manner and live on the diagonal; sleep was a collapse, and waking a squatting. . . . Every day through the unchanging restriction that stiffened his body, the condemned man learned that he was guilty and that innocence consists in stretching joyously.”¹⁸

Never has a man betrayed so desperate a need for God, yet refused to believe that He exists. Camus’ picture of reality has a defined place for God—for God in the Christian sense with many of those attributes ascribed to Him by Christians. But God does not exist, so Camus insists.

15. *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, tr. Justin O’Brien (New York, 1955), v. (The quotation appears in a preface to an edition of *The Myth of Sisyphus* published in 1955, but Camus was summing up what he had tried to say in 1942 at the time *The Myth* was written.)

16. *The Fall*, p. 117.

17. *The Fall*, p. 110.

18. *The Fall*, pp. 109, 110.

Camus recognizes that "God's sole usefulness would be to guarantee innocence, and I am inclined to see religion rather as a huge laundering venture—as it was once but briefly, for exactly three years, and it wasn't called religion. Since then, soap has been lacking, our faces are dirty, and we wipe one another's noses. All dunces, all punished, let's all spit on one another and—hurry! to the little-ease! . . . I'll tell you a big secret. . . Don't wait for the Last Judgment. It takes place every day."¹⁹

The problem, as Camus admits it, is that "for anyone who is alone, without God and without a master, the weight of days is dreadful."²⁰ "We have lost track of the light, the mornings, the holy innocence of those who forgive themselves."²¹ The only shift for man, therefore, is the continued confession of sins which will never be forgiven. Nevertheless when one man confesses his sins openly, other people will be caused to confess theirs also. And in consequence this man can put himself in the place of a Judge-God who views all mankind passing before him in judgment.

What do these pictures of despair tell the Christian? The most significant idea they state is that there is what Carl Michalson has called "a kind of self-awareness outside the church which is a wholesome spiritual expectation."²² Jean-Baptiste is anticipating—hopelessly! The man who would be a rebel against a universe which he has decided has no meaning does not possess the virility to stand alone. Sisyphus is too tired to keep rolling his stone up the hill. Norman Cousins has observed that "perhaps under certain circumstances and for limited periods man may make a virtue of defeatism, but over the long range his equilibrium will assert itself and he will hunger for inspiration and positive values."²³ Existentialism and Camus have taken seriously the two concepts: (1) man wishes to become like God—or be God; (2) modern life is a wasteland. The result expressed creatively is *The Fall*.

A curious detail of Camus' latest work is the similarity of expression to the writings of certain Christian mystics.²⁴ Especially in the stage of mysticism called "the thirst for God" does almost identical language appear, as a comparison with the famous mystics John of the Cross or Teresa of Avila would verify. But Camus' tragic sense of life is always on the move.

19. *The Fall*, p. 111.

20. *The Fall*, p. 133.

21. *The Fall*, p. 145.

22. "Existentialism Is a Mysticism," *Theology Today*, XII (October, 1955), 358.

23. "The Decline and Fall of Existentialism," *The Saturday Review*, XXXVII (July 10, 1954), 22.

24. Michalson on pages 355ff. of his article above points out the similarity of expression between existentialist writing in general and mystical writing. I believe his observation applies particularly to the works of Camus.

He has no hope that the eagle that struggles up to God can ever be changed by the grace of God into the dove that finds its rest in Him.

Camus' works should be watched carefully by the Christian. He has charted much of the drift of the Western mind. He has recognized (along with Karl Jaspers) that "the presence of gaps in the world structure, the failure of all attempts to conceive of the world as self-contained, the abortion of human planning, the futility of human designs and realizations, the impossibility of fulfilling man himself brings us to the edge of the abyss, where we experience nothingness or God."²⁵ Camus has met nothingness. And in the future we may see that God's spirit will change the chaos of nothingness into the creation of new life through Christ Jesus. If so, Camus may demonstrate that *The Fall* is the first step back into the grace of God. And we may see a prominent novelist take the "flight from the alone to the Alone."

25. Jaspers, *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*, tr. Ralph Manheim (London, 1950), p. 35.

LANGUAGE AND LOGIC

GORDON H. CLARK

I

In a previous article, "Logic and Language" (*The Gordon Review*, II [February, 1956], 3-9), I dealt most sketchily with the topic of language. The present attempt will go further into the subject.

This interest in language was motivated by the effect certain theories might have on the doctrine of verbal inspiration and on the literal interpretation of Scripture. The previous article showed this motivation clearly; but as the discussion becomes more technical here, the end in view may be temporarily lost sight of.

First it may be well to indicate roughly the nature of the subject by asking some of the questions that need to be answered: What is a word? How can a sound be meaningful? Does thought exist before and apart from language? How did language originate? Is language adequate for a knowledge of reality, or is its nature such that it automatically distorts the universe? Is all language symbolic and metaphorical, or are some sentences strictly literal? These and similar questions give a preliminary idea of the problem.

Let us choose as the starting point one phase of the origin of language. The Bible makes a brief mention of the diversification of tongues; but the origin of the previous single language is passed over in silence. Similarly,

outside the Bible, no historical information is available on the first occurrence of speech. For this reason theories of the origin of language are speculative conclusions based on more general philosophic principles.

A theory common today holds that words originate in sense experience. All words are supposed to have had originally a physical reference. Words denoting relations are said to be primarily spatial. If a word is said to *stand for* an object, the relation "standing for" is derived from positions in space; similarly a thought is *in* my mind as a chair is in a room; and what is worse, for logic, the *inclusion* of one class in another, e.g. all mammals are vertebrates, is also a spatial relationship.

If all words are primarily physical or sensuous, and if relations are basically spatial, either language cannot properly apply to spiritual and non-spatial subjects, or it must be explained how the physical meaning can be changed into a spiritual meaning. How can sensory experience give rise to words for soul and God? Attempts have indeed been made to explain this extension of language, and these attempts should not be prejudged without examination. At the same time the physical origin of language is today frequently put in a form that makes this extension extremely difficult and in fact impossible.

Evolutionary theory is committed to tracing human language back to the cries and grunts of animals. Then by slow, gradual, and unspecified changes, these animal sounds eventually after many centuries become the words of human language. Inasmuch as the individual steps in this process have never been enumerated, it is hard to test the theory. It is all the harder since in the first place the exact status of animal sounds is not too clear. Parent birds give warning cries to their fledglings, and this can be construed as an example of the indicative function of language. But the cry probably does not indicate whether the danger is a hawk or a human being. Perhaps it may be said that the cry means, *Danger!* or, *Look out!*, and thus some plausibility may be gained for the theory by assimilating the cry to a word-sentence. But whatever the indicative function of such a cry may be, it must be one that is extremely vague. Nothing descriptive of the object is said. Note too the important fact that animal sounds are instinctive; they remain the same in all countries where the species is found; they also remain unchanged from generation to generation; whereas the words of language do not.

If none the less it is possible to find some connection between animal sounds and human speech, the theory under consideration has taken a form in which instead of animal sounds developing into meaningful speech, speech is reduced to the level of animals. Or, it may even be said, human language is reduced below the level of cries and grunts, if these are supposed to bear some conscious meaning.

That is to say, evolutionary behaviorism not only makes language physical and sensory in its origin, but maintains it on the same level.

Leonard Bloomfield (*International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, I, i, 227) speaks of responding to sounds "in a kind of trigger effect." Four pages later he says, "The scientific description of the universe . . . requires none of the mentalistic terms because the gaps which these terms are intended to bridge exist only so long as language is left out of account." He then offers the choice of behaviorism, mechanism, operationalism, or physicalism. In the continuation he further asserts, "Language bridges the gap between the individual nervous systems" (p. 233); and "Thinking is inner speech" (p. 235). Here, of course, "inner" is spatial.

To avoid all mentalistic terms, naturalism equates the meaning of a word with the response of the organism, and the response is a physico-chemical reaction caused by the total environment. Not only the word but its meaning is a physical effect and in turn a physical cause. The word is not a sign of a concept, nor is the meaning a mental picture that resembles the object. Neither word nor meaning represents anything. The whole situation is exhausted in a chain of causes and effects in which a nervous system is one link. In animal behavior, when a robin sees a worm, the "sign" of the worm is a physical modification of the robin produced by light rays reflected from the worm. But one may wonder if the robin has a sign any more than the supermarket's electric eye has. And if this is the case, could not an early form of language be found in the electric eye? The behaviorist would doubtless agree, but others have an uncomfortable feeling that there is a difference between physical causation and the interpretation of signs. It is a difference that cannot be expressed in the physical categories of space and motion. A mind is needed. Beyond any motion there must be intellection. In language the words or signs can occur, perhaps not apart from all causation, but apart from the usual causation. We may use the term *worm* when we see one, or we may use the term merely as an example in a linguistic discussion. We may call it a noun and remark that it could be the subject of a verb. Are these remarks nothing but physical motions? Is the sound *worm* the chemical effect equally of light rays and a linguistic discussion? Is the sound *noun* nothing but a physical effect of previous physics? Here the behavioristic explanation can be accepted only on blind faith. No, not even on blind faith; but by blind physics. It happens, however, that my physics causes me to make other sounds, such as the sounds *mind* and *intellect*, and especially the sounds: The physics in my larynx is as good as the physics in yours.

It is not the present purpose, however, to itemize objections to the behavioristic theory of language. The important point is that the theory of language is not arrived at by a study of language. No one has ever seen

"language bridging the gap between two nervous systems." No one has ever isolated the cause which produced the word *worm* instead of the word *noun*. Instead of being based on a study of words, the behavioristic theory of language is an implication from the general position of naturalism. If the present discussion were mainly concerned with behaviorism, this general theory would require a more extended examination.

Eventually no doubt an alternate theory of language will also be based on some general worldview. References to and partial confirmation by linguistic phenomena must be appealed to; but it seems improbable that a purely phenomenological argument could place a theory of language beyond all doubt.

II

Let us then assume that an omnipotent God has created rational beings, beings who are not merely physical but essentially spiritual and intellectual, beings therefore who have the innate ability to think and to speak. What then are the implications relative to the problems of linguistics that can be drawn from this theistic presupposition?

Two sets of conclusions appear almost immediately. First, language cannot be assigned a solely sensory origin and a primitively physical reference. Theism of course need not deny that the names of animals and things refer to sensorily perceived physical objects; it need not deny that spatial relationships are well represented in language; it need not deny or distort any of our common gross experience. But it must assert that an essential purpose of thought and language is to think and talk about God and spiritual realities. The idea of God would be an immediate spiritual impression made by God in the soul; and the word *God* would be the vocal sign of that idea. For this reason a theistic theory of linguistics would not labor under the burden of giving a precarious derivation or development of spiritual meaning from primitive physical reference. The dubious appeal to metaphor, symbolism, or analogy to explain this transition would be unnecessary.

A second conclusion that comes quickly from the theistic presupposition is that language is adequate for its purpose. Behaviorists and other exponents of naturalism who do not acknowledge themselves as behaviorists hold that the purpose of language is to enable human beings to adjust themselves to the physical world. Since the universe is in a state of Heraclitean flux, the selecting and arresting of a stage of this flux for our practical attention is a distortion of reality. Or, the older atomistic theory arrives at the same linguistic conclusion from a different metaphysics. The ultimate realities are atoms, individual, discrete, disconnected, permanent particles. Language, on the contrary, is full of connectives humanly chosen, not be-

cause of anything in nature, but because these connections are useful in practical life. Therefore language is arbitrary and distorts nature.

Theism will deny that this is the purpose, at least the sole purpose, of language. Operationalism may well be an acceptable theory of positive science. Possibly the formulas of physics and chemistry are not descriptions of antecedent reality but are plans of action to bend nature to our desires. But if the physical world is neither the only nor the most important world, language and life have other purposes. The chief end of man is not to adjust to physical reality but to glorify God and to enjoy him forever. Inasmuch as language was given to man for this purpose, it must be concluded that language is theologically adequate.

III

Although these two linguistic principles will control the detailed development of a theistic theory of language, it does not seem possible to deduce these details from the principles without any appeal to linguistic phenomena. Our interpretation of language must conform to the basic theism, but the language to be interpreted is the ordinary language of everyday life. The program is similar to that of physics. A philosopher will insist a priori that all the laws of physics must conform to rigid mechanism, if such be his metaphysics; or, if not, he will make them statistical laws; but levers and freely falling bodies are to be found in the form of golf balls and clubs. In the same way we must consider the actual use of words.

From among the many interesting details of linguistic usage, we shall select but one for this article; and since the original motivation related to the literal interpretation of Scripture, that one will be the literal use of language. Until recently this would hardly have furnished an issue to be discussed; but in the recent past some linguists, studying metaphor and symbolism, have said that language is never to be literally understood.

To have something concrete to consider, quotations will be made from W. M. Urban's *Language and Reality* (1951). The great length of the volume and the later modifications of views given on earlier pages make it impossible to do full justice to the author's precise position. The quotations must be taken as they are, apart from the complete context, simply as fairly faithful expressions of a widely held point of view.

There are no strictly literal sentences [p. 433]. Now strictly speaking, there is no such thing as literal truth in any absolute sense, for there is no such thing as absolute correspondence between expression and that which is expressed. . . . Any expression in language contains some symbolic element [pp. 382-383].

Now, first, it may be remarked, if there are no literal sentences at all, the meaning of statements in the Bible is vitiated no more than the meaning of statements in Caesar's *Gallic Wars*. "David was king of Israel" and "All

Gaul is divided into three parts" are on the same level. They may both be called figurative or metaphorical or symbolic, but they are both historical in exactly the same sense. If all language is symbolic, the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures is no more in danger than the correct interpretation of any other text.

However, to call all language symbolic seems to empty of all significance the commonly recognized distinction between literal and figurative. Can one approve a theory of language that denies this distinction? What then was the reason for violating common usage?

Urban said, "There is no such thing as absolute correspondence between expression and that which is expressed." Accordingly, in the second place, one must ask whether there is absolute correspondence and whether this is required for literal meaning. The notion of correspondence is vague. No one supposes that a word corresponds to a thing in the way that a photo corresponds to its object. Language is not a picture of reality, and cannot possibly be in the case of spiritual realities, if such there be. But what if a word is a sign?

In criticizing the view that words are arbitrary or conventional signs of ideas and things, Urban several times appeals to an intuitive content in words. Primitive words are supposed to imitate, in some way or other, the things to which they refer. The word *ache*, derived from the sound *ach*, is supposed to sound like a pain feels. While some people with lively imaginations think that this is plausible, examples taken, not from one's mother tongue, but from unknown languages will remove the plausibility. One of Urban's examples is *ouatou* and *ouatou-ou-ou*. He first gives the meaning in English and then asks if the word does not sound like the thing. If it did, that is, if there were an intuitive meaning in the sound, it should be fairly easy to guess the meaning of the word. Now, among a million people someone might make a lucky guess; but the others would almost surely fail. Did you recognize all along that the two words mean *stream* and *ocean*?

On the other hand, if words are conventional signs, there can be absolute correspondence—if anyone wishes to call it that—by stipulation. This is seen most clearly in the terms that scientists deliberately coin. Volt and ohm "correspond" completely to their referents. At any rate, when one says that the electric circuit in the house is one of 110 volts, the language is utterly literal. Aside from the technical terms of science this is also true of many common sentences. The words *dog*, *chien*, and *Hund* have no intuitive content. They are mere signs. Therefore when one says, "The dog is black," one ordinarily expects to be taken literally. In such sentences there is no symbolic element. And this is true also of "David wrote the Psalms."

It must be admitted that Urban puts his finger on a serious difficulty in the view that words are conventional signs. It is that a first convention would not be understandable. Communication would be impossible. The biblical Adam and Eve or the first two evolutionary savages could not have talked to one another. Adam would have selected a sound for tree, sun, or air, and Eve would have had no idea what it referred to.

The difficulty of explaining communication has long been recognized. The famous treatise of St. Augustine was preceded by the keen insight of Gorgias. But the implausibility of intuitive content in words, the plausibility that they are mere signs, plus the fact that intuitive content itself would not be of much help in solving the enigma of communication are persuasive reasons for not following Urban.

There is another phenomenon also which, though it furnishes no explanation of communication, fairly effectively answers the objection to it. Even if some primitive words had an intuitive content, the languages of today have virtually none. Must not even Urban admit that ninety-five percent of all words are now conventional signs? Remember *dog*, *chien*, and *Hund*. But infants learn to speak and parents communicate with them. Not only so, but adults also have learned the little-known languages of remote tribes by living with them. These two miracles, the infant and the missionary, will be better understood within a theistic philosophy than on a naturalistic premise. But in any case the "absolute correspondence" of arbitrary signs to referents remains and literal sentences occur.

Urban's attack on the possibility of literal sentences continues by the alleged discovery of an ambiguity in the term *literal*.

The term literal is ambiguous . . . This may mean merely the opposite of figurative, and the rendering of symbolic sentences into literal sentences is equivalent to the expression of the figurative in non-figurative fashion. But literal has also another meaning, namely, primitive meaning. To interpret a symbol sentence literally would, then, be to interpret it according to the primary or original meaning of the words. If literal be taken in this second sense, then to say that expansion of a symbol sentence is the substitution of a literal sentence is wholly false. For the symbolic meaning is precisely not the literal meaning. So interpreted the symbol sentences, Napoleon is a wolf . . . are false [p. 433].

This quotation betrays a great confusion. The source and explanation of the confusion may become apparent a little later as his argument for the necessity of symbolism is further developed; but the point of confusion is obvious here. The quotation does not in fact give two meanings of the term *literal*. Literal in the sense of the opposite of figurative does not differ from literal in the sense of primitive meaning. Urban has taken for ambiguity in the term *literal* two different procedures of interpreting figurative sentences. The example was, "Napoleon was a wolf." The literal, non-figurative, primitive meaning of the word *wolf* is of course a certain type of wild animal. To say that Napoleon has four legs and a shaggy coat

is of course false. But while the predicate of the figurative sentence was not intended to be understood literally, the intended meaning can be stated in literal language: Napoleon was a wanton killer. And he is a wanton killer in the primitive and non-figurative sense of the words. Granted that the interpretation of a figurative sentence according to the primary and original meanings of the words results in a false or absurd misunderstanding of the intended meaning; yet it does not follow that the expansion of a symbol sentence by the substitution of a literal sentence is wholly false. It is a question of which literal words are chosen. It is not a matter of ambiguity in the term *literal*.

The source and motivation of this confusion lie in the view that "the symbol expresses adequately for our type of consciousness that which could not be fully expressed in 'literal' sentences" (p. 444). "It is not true that whatever is expressed symbolically can be better expressed literally. For there *is* no literal expression, but only another kind of symbol" (p. 500). "The symbolic consciousness, as we have seen, is a unique form of the cognitive consciousness" (p. 435). "Thus to expand the symbol tends to defeat its end as a symbol" (p. 434). Another contributing factor to the confusion above is the opinion that when the term *literal* is defined as primary meaning, "a literal sentence is one which refers to a sensuously observable entity. . . . Applying this notion of literal . . . to the language of morals and religion . . . all such language is pronounced meaningless" (p. 436). In order therefore to preserve some meaning in religious language against the attacks of the logical positivists, Urban believes he is forced to his view of symbolism.

However, one may ask why the idea of primary meaning must be equated with a sensuously observable referent? On the principles of a naturalistic evolution the motions of magic and incantation may have been the primary sensuous meaning of the word *God*. But even so, unless those savages had some prior notion of a being to be invoked, it is difficult to understand why they would have gone through the motions. A fortiori on theistic principles the idea of God, to which an arbitrary sign is given, comes directly from God; and the magic incantations of savages are deteriorated forms of a pure original worship. In such a degenerate religion it is quite possible that words of original spiritual meaning may have been transferred to physical objects, just as idols replace God. The term *God* therefore can be a literal term whose primary meaning is not sensuous.

IV

If then religious language can be literal, is it necessary to rely on symbols as adequate expressions of what cannot otherwise be adequately expressed? Is it not, on the contrary, more plausible to suppose that symbolic

sentences, whatever vividness and literary embellishments they afford, fail to express adequately what is fully, clearly, and accurately expressed in literal language?

Opposing any such suggestion Urban writes:

In Whitehead's words, the symbol is merely a surrogate for something else, and what we want is that something—not the substitute. In other words, the ideal would be to dispense with symbolism or to have wholly non-symbolic truth. This, it seems to me, is a fundamentally mistaken notion. In the first place, such an ideal is really impossible in view of the very nature of language and expression. If there were such a thing as wholly non-symbolic truth, it could not be expressed [pp. 445-446].

Yet this that Urban considers "a fundamentally mistaken notion" seems to another type of mind to be fundamentally correct. Some evidence has already been given in support of the contention that such an ideal is not really impossible. One further example will be given, and this must suffice.

As this final example, and to bring the discussion more closely into connection with the question of the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures, let us take the words of John the Baptist, "Behold the Lamb of God." The lamb is a symbol.

A symbol is a sign, but not all signs are symbols. The plus and minus signs of arithmetic, even though they may sometimes be called mathematical symbols, are just conventional, arbitrary signs. Marks of other shapes could have served as well. But as a symbol of Christ an elephant could not have served as well; and a fish was later used only because of an acrostic. John the Baptist's choice of a lamb was not arbitrary; it was rooted in the Mosaic ritual. An arbitrary sign, whether a word or a mathematical figure, merely designates the concept. When we are studying mathematics or reading a newspaper, we do not normally think of the shape of the signs, but rather we give exclusive attention to the thing signified. In the case of a symbol, however, some of our attention is fixed on the symbol. If the Baptist had said, "Jesus is Lord," no one would have given thought to the sound as such; and there is nothing in the situation except the sound and the meaning. But when he said, "Behold the Lamb," the situation included not only Jesus and the sound of the words, but also the lambs that the word *Lamb* summarized. To understand the Baptist's message about Christ therefore, it was necessary to think how literal lambs could symbolize Christ. This is not the case with a designatory sign.

John the Baptist expected his auditors to remember the sacrifices in which the worshipping sinner had placed his hands on the head of the lamb, killed the lamb, sprinkled the blood round about the altar, and burnt the lamb on the altar. Because of these reminiscences the Baptist's language was vivid. He pictured the ritual of the ages. One word summarized an entire religious system.

But is this symbolism adequate? Does it express what cannot otherwise be expressed?

Undoubtedly this symbolism was adequate to attract the attention of the auditors. In doing so, it functioned more effectively than a lengthy literal explanation. Symbolism and the more ordinary figurative expressions have their use; and unless they were better adapted to their aim than other language, they would cease to be used.

Yet, if the purpose is insight and understanding, symbolic language must be recognized as seriously inadequate. If a missionary should repeat John's words to people who had never heard of the Jews, the meaning would not be conveyed. Even if one knew that the Jews killed lambs and went through certain motions, one would hardly guess what John meant. First of all literal language is necessary to explain the significance of the Jewish sacrifices. The death of the lamb represented the penalty of sin incurred by the repentant Jew. But though the man had incurred the penalty, the penalty was discharged by a substitute. And God was satisfied. Yet the visible sacrifice was itself symbolic of a greater sacrifice. There was some future event prophesied in which one whose visage was so marred more than any man would be led as a lamb to the slaughter, by whose stripes we are healed. Then centuries later John the Baptist announced, "Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world." The Lamb is a symbol of the vicarious satisfaction of justice.

Without such a background of literal meaning, one could hardly guess the point of the symbol. One would not know what the symbol symbolized. The symbol is merely a surrogate for something else, and what we want is the real thing and not the symbol. To be sure, the lamb is not simply an arbitrary sign, as the swastika was for the Nazis; but unless some literal information was forthcoming, John's symbolic sentence could not be understood. With this information it can be.

On a theistic world view therefore, a view which holds that God created man and revealed himself to him in words, language is adequate for theology. Linguistics, unless controlled by naturalistic, atheistic presuppositions, can therefore offer no objection to the doctrine of verbal inspiration. The Scriptures contain metaphors, figures of speech, and symbolism; for the Scriptures are addressed to men in all situations—situations in which their attention needs to be aroused and their memory facilitated, as well as situations in which plain information is required. But since symbolic language and metaphor depend on literal meaning, the most intelligible and understandable expressions are to be found in the literal theological statements, such as those in Romans. And outside the Bible the most accurate and satisfactory expressions of Christianity are the carefully worded creedal statements of the Westminster Confession.

LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND THEOLOGY

- EUGENE A. NIDA

Within the twentieth century attention has been increasingly focussed upon the problem of human communication. Three significant events have contributed greatly toward this: (1) our shrinking world (Wendell Willkie's "One World" was more than an idle slogan), (2) the recognition of man's role as observer, interpreter, and participant in "reality," and (3) the development of "Information Theory," which has been regarded by many as the most significant scientific breakthrough of this century.

No one needs to be reminded of the way in which recent developments in communication and transportation have dwarfed space and at the same time heightened fears, for man has not been prepared sociologically for such spectacular technological advances. But whether we like our new world or not, we must certainly become adjusted to the fact that our survival depends very largely upon our capacity to communicate effectively, with both friends and foes.

In contrast with changes in our physical environments, developments in the philosophical orientation of man are less obvious to the average observer and far more difficult to appraise. They are, however, no less fundamental in assessing the significance of communication in our present-day world. Regardless of one's views of existential philosophy, it must be said that, whether on the academic or practical level, it has directly and indirectly contributed to a radical change in man's thinking about his own role as an observer of reality. It has forced him to realize that he cannot occupy any balcony seat in the drama of history or in the study of reality. He is part of the very subject matter which he wishes to study, and because of this he cannot be "objective" in the traditional sense of the word. Fortunately for the results of science and philosophy alike, the old myth of "scientific neutrality" and "complete objectivity" in any descriptive science has been debunked. Existentialism cannot, of course, be given all the credit for this development, but it has been one of the most articulate and systematic contributors. At the same time, however, Gestalt psychologists have from quite a different perspective insisted that any human observation is the result of a kind of selective regrouping and repatterning of all perceptually received data. Our minds may be described as possessing a kind of "grid" or "screen" which selects out and redistributes the elements in any complex perception.

Having thus come to recognize the impossibility of utter objectivity, most scientists have become somewhat more humble about their observations and more willing to recognize not only alternative interpretations, but

differences in balance and proportion. If, accordingly, this is true of the process of observation, how much more cautious must one be in the process of describing such phenomena by means of words, which have been found to possess these same non-absolute characteristics of all finite phenomena. Since, therefore, one cannot be dogmatic (i.e. speak with absolute finality) either about the objects of investigation or about the linguistic symbols used to describe them, it is quite obvious that one is forced to reappraise traditional attitudes about language and to study the fundamental nature of communication.

Information Theory, which is the fundamental concept underlying the modern field of cybernetics, has also highlighted the significance of communication, whether linguistic or nonlinguistic. These developments in the field of communication engineering are the indispensable element in all of modern automation, and by the application of the basic principles of the second law of thermodynamics (i.e. the principle of entropy or dissipation of energy) amazing new insights into the realm of communication and even the processes of human thought have been discovered. Accordingly, whether in the realm of socio-political developments or in the sphere of contemporary philosophical thought, or in the field of modern scientific discovery, one is forced to rethink one's concepts of and attitudes toward language and communication.

Communication vs. Epistemology

Contemporary developments in the study of language and the philosophy of symbolism (which are the two sides of the coin of human communication) have tended to shove into the background the older problems of epistemology, "the relationship of thought to reality." In its traditional form epistemology has been concerned primarily with the relationship of what are essentially word symbols to reality, whether noumenal (i.e. concepts) or phenomenal (i.e. objects). Modern attitudes toward these age-old problems are simply to let them rest as metaphysical "paradoxes," while we get on with the much more vital (and practical) problems of communicating, irrespective of some of the philosophical implications as to whether our thoughts (as formulated in symbols) properly reflect reality. Most philosophers are now much more concerned with how language functions to communicate what is possible by means of language, rather than worried about any metaphysical relationship between the thought processes involved and the reality about which one is thinking. In other words, modern philosophical interests have short-circuited the old problems by asking quite different questions. Now the emphasis is not so much on How do we think? and How are our thoughts related to reality? but How do we symbolize our thoughts? and How do we communicate by means of these symbols?

In view of this rather radical turn of events in contemporary philosophical interests, it is not surprising that some sectors of conservative Christianity have been left badly behind. Some Christian philosophers are continuing to pose the same old questions and to give the traditional answers slightly disguised in modern verbiage. Unfortunately for Christian apologetics, the questions which are answered are not the ones which most people are asking. They are good questions, e.g. How can the first part of Genesis be harmonized with contemporary scientific findings? and Can archaeology assure the inerrancy of the Scriptures? But most people are not asking these questions. These questions were asked in the last century, and for the most part rather unsatisfactory answers were given. What concerns people today are questions about the essential communicability of our faith, i.e. What is the relationship between the Bible and the Word of God? To what extent may divine communication be non-verbal? How may word symbols which have a particular meaning within the language of revelation be properly translated into another language, in which there are no exact equivalents?

Without an awareness of what has happened on the "philosophical front" (whether analyzed in terms of academic or popular interests and concerns), it is very possible to become a modern Don Quixote charging medieval windmills by fighting ideas which have long since died a natural death—or are at least in a state of coma unless roused to life by some injection of publicity-seeking propaganda.

A Focus of Present-day Philosophical Interest

Despite the widespread interests of contemporary philosophy and the myriad of schools which characterize the many individualistic efforts of different leaders in the field, there is perhaps one underlying focus which is characteristic, namely, symbolism. The one fact which clearly distinguishes man from all other forms of life is that he is a *symbol-using creature*, and it is this primary characteristic which has come suddenly into the limelight of contemporary philosophical concern. This does not mean that symbolism has not always played a very important role in philosophy. It has been exceedingly important, whether to the Platonists or the Pythagoreans or to the followers of Carnap and Russell. What makes the difference is that we are only now beginning to realize what previously we took for granted.

A very special branch of symbolism has been developed in the field of symbolic logic, which because of the inadequacies of language has attempted to define and describe relationships more accurately by certain arbitrary symbols. However, despite some highly significant developments in this restricted field, which embraces *principia mathematica*, the most widespread interest in symbolism centers in language, which is by far the most

extensive and elaborate system of symbols employed by man. Language (by which we mean, of course, any language) is not only the indispensable means of man's social intercourse (without which society could not exist), but it also is a reflection and, in a sense, a model of the culture of which the language itself is an integral part.

In this study of language as a fundamental feature of human existence anthropologists and linguists have joined forces to analyze some of the most fundamental problems of human existence, the relationship of language to culture and the functioning of language within the cultural context.

These studies in language and culture have been of crucial importance for any Christian apologetics, for Christianity is very much a "word-centered religion." "God spoke and it was done" is the explanation of God's creative acts; and "thus saith the Lord" is the keynote of the Old Testament. While other religions depend largely upon visual symbolism to represent their gods, the God of the Old Testament expressly forbade images. Even the incarnation is described as "The Word became flesh and dwelt among us." Moreover, the spread of Christianity is dependent primarily upon a word-carried message, and the objective focus of present-day Christianity is for many persons the Bible. This being the case, Christians cannot afford to be unaware of contemporary developments in the field of language and culture, which in such large measure will determine the degree to which Christianity is likely to be transmitted within this generation.

Fundamental Facts about Language

Linguists and anthropologists have made hundreds of detailed studies of language and culture—from the Tobrianders of the South Pacific to the Eskimos of Labrador, from the Zulu of South Africa to the Laplanders of Scandinavia, and from the Quechua of Bolivia to the Basques of Iberia. The results of these analyses have revealed several fundamental facts about languages: (1) all languages are an integral element in the culture of which they are a part, (2) there is no scale of languages from primitive to civilized or from simple to complex, and (3) no language possesses a perfect structure for the communication of concepts.

Such facts as these may seem entirely too obvious to warrant their being noted, but despite what should be evident many people still possess false ideas about languages, especially about those of distant, so-called primitive peoples.

That languages are an integral element of the culture of which they are a part is almost a truism, but it often needs some further explanation. For the most part, what is meant is simply that the words of any language have meanings only in terms of the particular culture in question. For example, in Hebrew the root *kbd* occurs with the meanings of "heavy,"

"much," "numerous," "burdensome," "grievous," "difficult," "riches," "wealth," "prestige," and "glory." This, however, would be true only of an originally nomadic culture in which weighty objects (which had to be carried) could be either burdensome and difficult (if of little value) or a source of wealth and prestige (if valuable). Similarly, *qds* may mean not only "holy" but may signify a temple prostitute, something which would be impossible in our own culture, for we do not have fertility cult worship which could give rise to such associations. All of this may seem quite obvious, but we must not lose sight of the fact that for the speakers of any language the word symbols they employ have meaning only on the basis of the speakers' experience with the culture in question.

The fact that linguists have never discovered any truly "primitive languages" (but only so-called "primitive cultures") is often not fully accepted, for we have been conditioned by our essentially "evolutionary viewpoint" to expect that people who have a very simple material culture (even though they may have a very complex social or religious life) must of necessity be rather stupid, and hence not capable of speaking grammatically elaborate or complex languages. Accordingly, it is rather a shock for people to learn that in some of the languages spoken by primitive Amazonian Indians every verb may have at least 25,000 different forms and be much more elaborate and logical (if we may use the word "logical" in a somewhat popular sense) than Greek or Hebrew ever thought of being. Even in the matter of vocabulary so-called primitive tongues have been found to be amazingly rich; e.g., there is a dictionary of Zulu with more than 30,000 entries. Some languages spoken by peoples of preliterate cultures (the technical definition of "primitive" as contrasted with "civilized") are as grammatically simple as English, which during the centuries has lost most of its inflexional affixes; but others are far more intricately structured than anything familiar to us in the Indo-European or Semitic tradition. This does not mean that so-called primitive languages are necessarily better or more efficient than our own. They are just different, but their differences are such as to make impossible any classification of "primitive" and "civilized."

Closely related to this second fundamental fact about language is the third, namely, that there is no perfect language. Categories such as number, tense, and gender (which are so familiar to us in most European languages) may be utterly missing in other languages, which, on the other hand, may indicate such categories as animate or inanimate objects, inclusive and exclusive first person plural (i.e. whether in saying "we" one includes or excludes those spoken to), the once-for-all or repetitive character of an action, etc. But despite the elaboration of categories and the intricate system

for showing relationships of words, no language is without serious structural inadequacies. For example, there are more than 700 grammatical ambiguities in the Greek Gospels, passages in which there is structural ambiguity as to the relationship of words. Not all these structural deficiencies result in obscurity of meaning, for the context often supplies the answers, but nevertheless, there are many which remain objects of doubt — witness the long discussions on such problems which fill the pages of New Testament commentaries.

Fundamental Facts about Communication

As derivatives of the basic facts about the nature of languages as they are related to culture, there are three fundamental observations about language in its relationship to communication: (1) no two people mean exactly the same thing by any one word, (2) no two words in any one language have completely identical meanings, and (3) no two or more words in any two or more languages have exactly the same meanings.

As in the case of the three fundamental facts about the nature of language, these three statements about communication within and between languages may seem to be self-evident, but they are not widely recognized truths. If, however, we remember that a word only has meaning for a person in terms of his background within a particular culture, we must recognize that no word will have exactly the same meaning for any two persons, for no two persons have identical backgrounds. Of course, the differences in meaning may be very slight, but no two persons have identical experiences; and since the meanings of words for such persons are dependent upon the language-culture associations the words must be somewhat different in their range of symbolization.

Some persons may insist that all this insistence upon differences of meaning for different persons is much to-do about nothing, for in the first place people are not aware of such differences on a practical level, and in the second place, even if they were, there must be a "correct dictionary meaning" and any other meaning is just an error. In answer to such objections we can only say that admittedly within any one face-to-face speech community there is a high degree of agreement as to the meaning of words, but even then numerous arguments and severe misunderstandings can arise simply because of the differences in the meanings of words. However, this fact of marked differences of understanding, which are obvious in at least some percentage of the vocabulary, exists for all the vocabulary, even if in a very slight degree. However, the greater the difference in dialect, the more will be the divergency in meaning.

In reply to the second objection one can only say that "a correct, dictionary meaning" is an illusion. The dictionaries, which must be constantly

revised as the language changes, only record meanings for words as reflected by a certain group of people, chosen by the makers of the dictionary as constituting their "norm." Such a norm is only the usage of a particular dialect, and even within such a limited constituency there are differences of usage. Furthermore, though the dictionary meaning may acquire a temporary acceptance by a group of persons, this nevertheless does not mean that all the individuals who apparently subscribe to the meaning (or meanings) in question have the same backgrounds as those whose original usage determined the dictionary choice. Furthermore, it certainly does not mean that all those who use the dictionary understand the definition in the same way.

All this "fussing" about differences in meaning may seem to be strange, but it is certainly not irrelevant to our problem, for we are too much the victims of word-worship. Once we have a name for something, we think we possess some magic power over it; and if several people concur in using the same word, they seem joined by some mystic ties, as initiates of the same verbal cult (witness how some Christians tend to judge the orthodoxy of others by noting the use of the approved "cultic" words).

To say that "no two words in any one language have completely identical meanings" may seem at first to be utterly contradictory, for we are all well aware of whole books of synonyms, which are popularly regarded as being equivalent words. However, they are not completely equivalent, for no two words in any language have an identical range of usage. For example, though *beauty* and *pulchritude* are listed as synonyms, one cannot use them interchangeably. Compare, for example, *a bathing beauty* with *a bathing pulchritude*. So-called synonymous words may share a number of positions of occurrence, e.g. *tall building* and *high building*, and *tall tower* and *high tower*, and *tall story* but not *high story*. If two words within any language were to be completely identical for any speaker of the language, they would have had to occur with equal frequency in all the language-culture contexts of his experience. This is obviously quite impossible, and we can only conclude that no absolute synonyms exist.

On the other hand, for us to say that there are no two words with completely identical meanings within any one language does not seem quite as arbitrary as to assert that there are no two (or more) words in different languages that have exactly the same meanings. However, if we remember that words have meanings only in terms of the cultural backgrounds of the speakers in question, and if, as we must admit, all language-culture complexes are to some degree different, then it follows quite properly that no two words are completely identical. However, one is still often left with nagging questions. But what about very simple words such as "bird"

or "cat"? Are the equivalents of these not identical in meaning between languages? To a great extent they are, but not completely so. For example, the English word *bird* is translatable in Spanish by two words *pajaro* and *ave*, the first being the more common term and the other the more poetic, a distinction which we do not have in English. Furthermore, we can say in English a "queer bird" when speaking of a strange, difficult kind of person, but there is no equivalent idiom in Spanish using either *pajaro* or *ave*. However, *pajaro* is used in some parts of Latin America to designate a male sexual pervert, which we in English would call a "fairy." We could go on endlessly pointing out such differences, for they are endless. However, anyone who has had any experience with reading letters written in English by foreigners who have had to depend upon dictionaries for determining equivalences will have no difficulty in understanding what is meant by this insistence upon the nonagreement between languages as to the meanings of the linguistic symbols which are employed.

Theological Implications in the Fundamental Facts about Language and Communication

If we are to take seriously the fundamental facts about language and communication—and we must do this if we are to understand our contemporary problems—we must conclude that absolute communication is impossible. If no two people understand any set of symbols in exactly the same way, then absolute communication is only a theoretical goal, and never a practical human reality. Moreover, it follows from this that it is impossible to formulate absolute meanings of words, for we can describe the meanings of certain word symbols only by using other word symbols. These are not and cannot be made absolute, for we are dependent (1) upon a finite culture, which is always in the process of change, and (2) upon language, which is never perfect nor absolute in its structure nor in the categories expressed.

If this is true (and it is), one may wonder how human intercourse can be maintained, for people obviously attain a relatively high degree of mutual understanding, despite constant failures to communicate exactly. Our only conclusion is that though communication is not absolute, it is attained to a degree of overwhelming probability. That is to say, one cannot be absolutely sure of what anything uttered by someone else may mean (for he cannot have had the other person's language-culture experience), but he can generally know enough of his background and linguistic usage to be certain to the point of overwhelming probability.

At this point we are not far from the results of contemporary scientific discoveries in other realms, for the present-day physicist cannot claim the same absolute finality for the "laws" of nature which the scientist of

the past two centuries felt he had established. Rather, in all fields of modern scientific work there is a notable humility about one's descriptive statements of phenomena. But is this not the way it should be? As scientists we may only describe finite phenomena; and the only absolute with which man may ultimately deal is God Himself.

On the other hand, when anyone speaks of communication as being non-absolute, many tend to fear that this means an assertion that everything is completely relative, including divine revelation. Such persons presume that if all communication is thus relative, one cannot believe in an absolute God. At this point, however, we must remind ourselves that even though a formulation in language may not be absolute in its form, it may nevertheless symbolize (in the sense of "stand for") an absolute truth. The fact that the linguistic forms of our doctrinal statements cannot be regarded as absolute does not mean that they are incapable of revealing truth about an absolute God.

In attempting to understand this problem of non-absolute communication we often suffer from certain emotional attitudes which tend to color our thinking, for we have become so familiar with and confident of our creedal formulations that we regard any suggestion as to their non-absolute character as being a reflection upon God Himself. However, when we realize that no language is perfectly structured and that the meanings of the symbols depend for their significance upon the finite culture of which they are a part, then we can be more sympathetic with the fact that in any language symbolization we have something less than an absolute. But this recognition of the imperfect nature of language and hence the limitations of our knowledge should not alarm us. Paul states quite frankly that "we see now as in a mirror darkly," in other words, we see only a reflection of reality and this is obscure. Furthermore, we even talk of realities which we cannot even conceptualize. For example, we say that we believe in the Trinity, but even though we may give a definition of the word, we cannot actually conceive of the Trinity, for there is absolutely nothing within our finite experience which adequately corresponds to the concept of being one and at the same time three.

In view of the imperfections of human language, one may ask, "Then why did God choose to reveal Himself by this means?" We, of course, do not know the reasons for God's revelation of Himself, whether in language (as God spoke to the prophets) or in flesh (in the person of His Son), but we know that God did reveal Himself and that He did so both in language and in flesh. But one must take note of the manner in which this was done, for it was not in infinite, but in finite, human categories. We know, for example, that God is spirit, and yet the Scriptures speak of God's mouth, hands, arms, feet, and throne. However, the use of these terms,

which have meaning to people only in terms of their own cultural backgrounds, is simply an evidence of the manner in which God has been willing to employ finite human categories to reveal *something* of his own nature (we use *something*, for God has not revealed *all* about Himself). However, the limitations upon revelation imposed by language (and furthermore the specific languages of Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek, with the particular cultural context of the language communities in question) are very similar to those which were characteristic of the bodily incarnation, for Christ emptied Himself (the *kenosis* doctrine) and took on Himself the nature of man. In so doing, He accepted certain finite limitations, including those of the culture of which He was a part. (If we deny this limitation, we make a mockery of the humanity of our Lord, and accordingly to say that He was tempted in all points even as we would be nonsense. Only a realistic acceptance of the humanity of Jesus can do justice to the Gospel accounts and insure His deity.)

In speaking of God's communication to man we tend too often to think only of the Bible, but the Bible is essentially the record of God's self-disclosure at certain crucial times and places, and preeminently in the life, death, and resurrection of His Son. But those who believe most emphatically in the historical faith, once and for all delivered to the saints, also insist that God communicates to man by means of His Holy Spirit. We may describe the historical revelation in the Bible as being a verbal one, but this does not mean that the Holy Spirit does not communicate today, for if it were not for the fact that the Holy Spirit communicates new life to the believer by His miraculous power the historical events of Scripture would be valueless for us.

On the other hand, this recognition of the special type of communication of the Holy Spirit does not mean a kind of irresponsible mysticism of "hearing voices," but the teaching always held by the church that men may be guided by the Holy Spirit in the life of faith. However, we must admit that the particular means by which the Holy Spirit communicates this guidance is mysterious, for in most instances it does not conform to our categories of human communication. We might even distinguish between the two types of communication by saying that in the Scriptures the communication is verbal and that the continued guidance of the believer by the Holy Spirit is a nonverbal communication.

Though the realistic appraisal of the limitations of language may seem to destroy some of our confidence in the creedal formulations which we have held, there is a great compensation, for such a view of language should not only make us more humble about such formulations of truth and less denunciatory of the minor deviations of others, but it should turn our attention from the symbols which only stand for truth and point us to the

truth itself. Unfortunately, since Christianity is so much a "verbal faith," it is possible to become so enamored with the recital of our beliefs that we fail to experience the reality of which the creed is only a description, and an imperfect one at that, for who could be so uninformed as to presume, for example, that in his linguistic formulation of the atonement he has exhausted the full meaning. Moreover, the experience of being atoned for by Christ is an indispensable part of the meaning of the atonement, and so for this fact no recitation of historical events can substitute. However, man's love for symbols rather than for the reality expressed by the symbols constantly leads him into idolatry. At first the pagan makes an image of his god to remind him of his nature and presence. But it is not long before the image is no longer a symbol of the god, but has become the god. The near and the tangible has replaced the distant and the imperceptible. So it is with words, for we are often guilty of making idols of words, just as those make idols of wood, and we worship them with the same blind faith. We may know the doctrines about Christ, but not know Christ. We may be able to recite the creedal declarations about the Holy Spirit, but not possess the Spirit. We may declare the fatherhood of God, but not have Him as our Father.

Signs, Symbols, and Figurative Language

In the preceding sections we have examined the application to communication of certain general principles derived from the nature of language and culture. We should now undertake to examine some of the characteristics of language in greater detail so as to determine more precisely the function of language symbols in the process of communication, for there is considerable confusion as to distinctions between signs and symbols and between symbols and so-called symbolic (or figurative) language. For the exegete of the Scriptures these problems become rather acute in many instances. For example, there may not be much doubt as to how to interpret the figurative content in the didactic or semilyric poetry of the Psalms, but what should one do about the highly intricate poetic structure of the book of Job? To what extent, for example, is the historical framework to be interpreted as a figurative, symbolic context? Similarly, the parables present somewhat of a problem, for some literalists insist that the parables of Jesus, including the Rich Man and Lazarus and the Good Samaritan, are primarily accounts of historical events. Most exegetes, however, have taken them to be a special type of figure of speech, literally, "likeness" (Greek *parabole*). Those, however, who insist that some of these illustrations used by Jesus are strictly historical and others only figurative have not been able to suggest any acceptable literary criteria for determining which is which.

In order to interpret correctly the nature of figurative language (also

called "symbolic language" by some), we need to study something of the total nature of symbolism and the way in which not only individual word symbols are employed, but also the patterns in which they are put together into larger frameworks.

Words are often spoken of as signs as well as symbols. However, present-day usage generally distinguishes between signs and symbols, although this is often a rather subtle distinction and there is no universal agreement as to this differentiation. For the most part, however, one finds the term *sign* restricted to the use of a word as an integral part of an immediate context. In this situation, accordingly, it acts as a pointer and an indicator of an immediately perceptible feature. In this usage, however, we can say that animals employ signs. For example, a hen uses several different kinds of noises to denote different activities or circumstances: (1) after laying an egg, (2) in keeping young chicks together as they go about looking for food, (3) in warning of impending danger, e.g. the flight of a hawk, and (4) when seriously hurt. There are likewise differences in the barks of dogs. However, these different types of noises (which we may classify as special kinds of "utterances") are not culturally learned; they are inherited techniques of response and are employed by animals whether or not they have heard them from other animals of the same species. Moreover, these different noises are used only in the immediate context of pain, surprise, aggression, hunger, etc.; they are never used to "talk *about* such experiences apart from the experiences themselves."¹ There are, of course, expressions in languages which closely approximate such animal signs, e.g. *Ouch! Ouch!* and *Ssshbb!* Such human noises are not, however, innate, for they differ widely from one language to another (compare English *ouch* with Spanish *ay ay*). They are used for the most part in immediate contexts, and as such may be described as types of signs. However, because of the essential difference between these noises (whether animal or human) used in immediate contexts and the 99% plus of the vocabulary of any language, we speak of the words of a language as being symbols, not signs. Furthermore, the term *sign* would seem to imply a too immediate connection between a word and its referent, while *symbol* more adequately denotes the fact that such a linguistic form may acquire certain values which may or may not exist in its referents. It is at this point that we begin to see something of the specialized nature of language as a system of symbols.

Man uses language in a multitude of ways, for he not only talks about things that he is not doing or has never done or never expects to do (something quite impossible in the so-called "languages" of animals), but he can construct symbols for things which he has never seen, e.g. *atoms*,

1. Animals may, of course, be trained to recognize new signs and to employ them, but such signs are not used as symbols.

electrons, infinity, and the universe. Moreover, from a series of objects and events he may abstract certain characteristics and identify them with a symbol, e.g. *good, bad, red, fast, and comfortable.* All this would not make language so complex if it were not for the fact that people intrude themselves into the very process of using the symbols, for they acquire emotional attachments for words because of the language-culture contexts in which they have been used. For example, different people have quite different emotional reactions to such words as *love, liberalism, communism, revolution, daddy, buddy, red, and fried chicken.* It is not primarily the objective nature of the referent which determines the emotive (or connotative) value of such symbols, but the personal involvement of the speakers. Moreover, this involvement may be highly irrational, but it is nevertheless a part of the value of the word symbol, in the same way that Nazis reacted to the swastika and Buddhists respond to the symbol of the wheel with eight spokes. Words as a part of language are a part of the culture, but so are people a part of the culture, for it is their system of behavior. Hence, words become an integral part of human existence—so integral that thinking itself is done primarily by the technique of manipulating word symbols.

Up to the present time we have spoken as though words had a kind of independent symbolic existence as separable entities. In a sense this is true, but it is only a partial truth, for in actuality words represent only one level of language structure. Below the level of the word there are a limited number of structures in which smaller units may combine to form words, e.g. *faithfulness* and *thermonuclear.* Above the word level there is an almost infinite possibility of combinations, but from the standpoint of the semantic relationships these can be described of two quite distinct types: endocentric and exocentric.

For the most part, word symbols are added to each other in such a way that the resultant meaning of the combinations may be determined readily by "adding up" the meanings of the constituent parts. Such meanings are known as semantically endocentric and can be well illustrated by at least 90% of all the expressions used in any language, e.g. *he wanted to help her, the bag of apples, and in front of the post office.* However, all languages also possess combinations of words the meaning of which cannot be determined by adding up the constituent parts. These are the idioms and special figures of speech which are essentially exocentric in meaning, for the meaning of the combination is not to be determined on the basis of the sum of the parts, e.g. *heap coals of fire on one's head, gird up the loins of the mind, and children of the bridechamber.* If we are to understand such expressions we must not take them literally, any more than we

can afford to take literally such English idioms as *he is in the doghouse*, *horsefeathers*, *he fed her a line*.

Types of Figurative Language

All languages possess figurative expressions, and in general it is not difficult for the members of any language community to know whether a combination of words is to be understood in an endocentric or exocentric manner (for example, *he is in the doghouse* could be understood literally, but such a meaning or interpretation would not be likely). The metaphorical value of expressions can usually be ascertained from the context. When Jesus speaks of Herod as a "fox" we are not in doubt as to the fact that Jesus has reference to certain nonphysical characteristics. When there is any great likelihood that metaphorical language may be misunderstood, it is quite common for languages to employ so-called similes, by which we mean the addition of some word such as "like," "as," "similar." For the most part, there are few theological difficulties with such figures of speech, except for the anthropomorphisms, which cause many people to think of God as "the old man in the sky" and which produce considerable embarrassment for some overly literalistic theologians. Some have explained anthropomorphisms purely on the basis that this was the only way in which men could imagine God, but it is also equally true that these were the only means by which God could reveal Himself to men, for God limited Himself to the categories of human language in order to reveal what are essentially nonhuman characteristics, His infinite power, love, and grace.

Certain types of communication are characterized by a higher percentage of figurative language, and as a part of such communications there are often important formal clues to the interpretation. For example, the structure of poetry provides a clue to the treatment of many expressions as figurative rather than literal. By virtue of the strictly formal structure we know that such expressions as "my cup runneth over" and "beside the still waters" and "the valley of the shadow of death" are not to be taken literally.

Our problem becomes somewhat more acute in certain types of communications where the formal clues are not so evident, e.g. in apocalyptic literature, as in Ezekiel and Revelation. Are we, for example, to interpret the twenty-four elders (Rev. 4: 4) as endocentric and the sharp, two-edged sword proceeding from the mouth of the Son (Rev. 1: 16) as exocentric? Are the gates of the city (Rev. 21: 21) real but the vials of wrath (Rev. 16: 1) only figurative? Is a place such as Babylon (Rev. 17) to be interpreted as symbolic (i.e. standing for Rome) but expressions of time, e.g. the thousand years (Rev. 20: 2-3), to be understood literally? These are problems which have disturbed some exegetes for centuries, and the

clues to interpretation can only be found in the study of the use of exocentric language in literature based upon the motif of a vision (compare the visions of Ezekiel). Note, however, that in speaking of a vision motif we do not call in question the validity of the vision; we are only dealing with the communication in terms of its literary form and its semantic value.

Clues to the interpretation of the symbolic nature of the parables of Jesus are provided not only in the explanations given by Jesus, but by the fact that they have a very special formal structure and were readily recognized by the hearers as being a type of figurative expression, called parables. However, the fact that in the parable of the Sower Jesus was not speaking of a particular sower with whom He was acquainted or that the story of the Prodigal Son is not a description of exactly what happened to a particular family does not make such parables any less true. In fact, such "illustrations" are made more true because they have been made more universal in their application by not being tied to the life or circumstances of any one individual or set of individuals.

The controversy over the correct mode of interpretation of the early chapters of Genesis centers primarily on this issue of endocentric vs. exocentric interpretation. For example, to what degree can one extend to other features of the accounts the criteria employed in interpreting the "days" in an exocentric manner, i.e. as long periods of time?

Hierarchy of Symbols

In studying the areas of meanings of symbols it becomes immediately evident that some words have relatively small areas of meaning, and others very large ones. The words with wider areas of meaning are generally the abstract, generic terms, e.g. *object, form, reality, substance, matter, thing*. In general we regard these words with wider areas of meaning as being more important, for they seem to mean more. In a sense this is true, but these words are quite deceptive, for though they may mean more (i.e. symbolize more referents), they generally carry less "information."

Information Theory has provided us some very important clues to the nature of communication and has helped us to give meaningful answers to questions which have up till now plagued us with uncertainty. Why is it, for example, that we can often communicate much more by an illustration than by a generalized statement? Why do certain novels communicate more about human nature than many volumes on psychology, psychiatry, and sociology? Why did Jesus employ parables ("illustrations") as the primary method by which He revealed to men the way of life and the purpose of the Father?

On the basis of Information Theory we know that words with generalized meanings cover a wider area of experience and hence can be regarded

as relatively more predictable of occurrence. For example, the highly generalized word *thing* may be used to refer to hundreds of thousands of objects. Actually, it means so much that it means very little in any one context, and in many contexts it would be more or less redundant, for it could be almost predicted. In any course in writing one is taught to try to avoid such generic terms which carry little information.

This same principle may be applied to various levels of communication. Jesus, for example, could have communicated the truth of the story of the prodigal son in terms of "the profligacy of one member of a family, in contrast with callous self-interest of another, with both related to the head of the family in a dependent relationship involving love and equity." However, this generic statement does not begin to communicate the information contained in the parable as Jesus told it.

It is of singular interest that the Bible is almost totally lacking in completely abstract, generic discourse. No place in the Scripture is there anything that even approaches a systematic theology. At no time, for example, did Paul sit down to write an essay on a particular theme. Even those communications which touched on such subjects were letters written to specific people in answer to particular problems. Likewise, the appeals of the prophets were not generalized admonitions but specific declarations concerning actual happenings and relevant crises.

We must not conclude that because there are different levels of discourse (in terms of a scale from specific and concrete to generalized and abstract) one is less true than another. The letters of Paul are not any truer (and certainly no clearer) than the teachings of Jesus. The various types of discourse may be equally true, but the more specific and concrete carries more information, and because it communicates more, it is more appealing.

This highly communicative nature of the Scriptures, in contrast with most books about the Bible (especially systematic theologies and other similar treatments which recast the truths of the Bible into highly generic vocabulary) explains part of the reason why in generation after generation the Bible continues to have its inimitable appeal. Even contemporary theology has become much less "systematic" and more biblical. This is precisely the way it should be, for the philosophical systems (whether Aristotelian or Platonic) which have provided the framework for the "systematic theologies" have not been essentially biblical. Witness, for example, the traditional, but non-biblical, doctrine of man's divided personality resulting from Greek categories of thought.

In this brief treatment of some of the theological implications in the study of contemporary developments in linguistics and anthropology, we

have been able to indicate only a few of the points at which the nature of the language and culture can throw light upon age-old theological problems. However, in such a study there are not only hints as to possible answers to old questions, but an indication of means by which we may more effectively communicate the Gospel in our present world.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

The Church and Modern Science, by Patrick J. McLaughlin, New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. 374 pp. \$7.50.

In 1953 Pope Pius XII explained to the First International Congress of Medical Genetics that "if you reflect on what we have said about research and scientific knowledge, you will see that neither from the side of reason nor from the side of thought oriented in a Christian sense are any barriers raised to investigation, to knowledge, or to affirmation of truth." It is in the spirit of demonstration of this thesis that Father McLaughlin's book is written. Built around a collation of partial or complete addresses by the present pope on a wide variety of scientific and technical areas, the author has attempted to describe the attitude of the Roman faith to modern science and its fruits. This he accomplishes either by frequent explanatory and amplificatory notes or by developing a neo-Thomistic philosophy of natural science and its moral import in a more ordered and thorough manner.

The volume begins with a lengthy discourse on the theory and grounds of science and its relation to philosophy and theology. This portion follows the "handbookish" method common in Catholic cosmological works with its attendant combination of clarity and the uncomfortable feeling of oversimplification. One will look here in vain for much of the *weltanschauung* which motivates most modern scientists—indeed the thought of contemporary philosophers of science is given rather cavalier treatment. While the reviewer is quite sympathetic with any attempt at an inclusion of science within a Christian metaphysic, he suspects neither theocentric essentials nor the great powers of modern logical and interpretive techniques in experiment are to be served with a natural theology nor its attendant Aristotelian outlook.

Following this are the papal addresses. While the difficulties mentioned above are just as apparent here, one cannot fail to be impressed by the informed discourse on a bewildering array of topics available to a church leader given guidance by capable advisers and enabled to speak as the voice of nearly all his followers. Neither is as readily available to the Protestant—indeed they may not be wholly desirable—but it is unfortunately the case that few of our leaders even attempt to define ade-

quately their attitude on similar topics. Astrophysics and geophysics, television and propaganda techniques, radiology and atomic physics, labor theory and evolution, genetics and medical ethics, legal theory and psychology are exemplary of some of the discourses included.

As a ready source of current Roman Catholic ideas on the broad sweep of science and its role in society this book is most valuable. As a source of many fine insights on the latter the work is highly commended, but for other than informational import the former is likely to prove of considerably less use in developing a Christian view of science capable of challenging the contemporary world.

—Thomas H. Leith

The American Sex Revolution, by Pitirim Sorokin. Boston: Porter Sargent Pub., 1956. 186 pp. \$3.50.

A significant picture of our time is here opened before us through the eyes of one of the world's leading sociologists. The author of more than thirty books is not a popular writer, nor an alarmist, but a careful analyst of cultures and their mores. Dr. Sorokin pictures in a series of snapshots some disturbing facts about our culture, and when placed beside similar snapshots of ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, Italy and modern Europe, a glaring similarity. Thus he concludes that our culture has passed through their stages of continence, creativity, freedom, looseness and is now facing decay. Sober persons of mature years will easily agree with the impressive facts here marshalled that America is rapidly deteriorating in these areas of morals. Both *Nation* and *New Republic* have sought to undermine Sorokin's conclusions by calling attention to the absence of statistics in this book. The preface states the reason for the book as "a more developed version of the article in the form of a non-technically written small volume accessible to the intelligent lay-reader. . . . All the references to the sources of each statement are intentionally omitted."

Sorokin cites public entertainment, books, magazines, the arts, divorce rates and crime as bases for his conclusion that we have run the cycle. In the last chapter he suggests a way out, which is the "desexualization" of our culture. To the reviewer, it would take more than such an item of common grace to accomplish this end.

While this book pictures a leading segment of the social morass, it does not give us even a candid camera shot of the role of the rise of family life and marriage preparation courses in high schools and colleges in the last decade. This has risen to more than 500 courses on the college level alone with more than 700 teachers. Neither is there an acknowledgment of the swiftly rising birthrate in the middle-class and upper middle-class strata of American society. Another heartening snapshot might be

taken from the emphasis on family life in the home magazines and other publications. Still another one could be caught of the "Family Life" division of every major denomination to nurture a "whole-type" family life within its constituency. However, these few bright spots only serve to contrast a dark and heavy cloud that is ready to burst. As a sociologist, Sorokin reveals a national picture which can only be positivized by the spread of personal Christianity.

— Charles G. Schauffele

Inspiration and Interpretation, edited by John W. Walvoord. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957. 280 pp. \$4.50.

The brilliance and usefulness of some of the contributions to this symposium overcome the inherent disadvantages of the symposium form. Nine essays deal with the views of nine important figures in the history of the church who have expressed themselves on the inspiration of the Scriptures. The tenth and concluding contribution presents a view of the current evangelical position on the same subject. The volume is a publication of the Evangelical Theological Society and the authors are sympathetic to the position of that organization.

The first three or four pages are a trite and, as it turns out, misleading start, for after them the reader gets into a very careful and helpful study of Irenaeus' view of Scripture by J. Barton Payne of Trinity Seminary. It is a splendid analysis, the longest in the book, and especially useful in correcting the unbalanced views presented by most modern students of Irenaeus who tend to be Anglo- or Roman Catholics because of their special interest in the period. The comments on the recent work of John Lawson: *The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus* are especially worthy of note.

Probably the most valuable chapter in the book is the one concerned with Calvin by Kenneth S. Kantzer of Wheaton College (Illinois). It is also an intensely interesting one. Here we have a well-elaborated and well-organized discussion of Calvin's view of the Bible. It is a *multum in parvo*. The difficult questions are not dodged. It can hardly be overpraised. This is just what is needed. To be sure, there are a few minor reservations to be made. The emphasis on the believer's "full and complete" (p. 117) knowledge of God, (*cf.* also p. 128) is overdone, nor do the two references to Calvin offered in support warrant the expression. It is misleading.

Kantzer is very certain as to the relationship in Calvin's mind between the unique *indicia* of Scripture and the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. He believes that B. B. Warfield misunderstood this (notes 47, 62). In the judgment of the reviewer, Kantzer is right when he says that, according to Calvin, the proofs "can never be *the* ground for true faith but only *a* confirming ground" (p. 126). We wish Calvin had been a little more "explicit" than he is, but Kantzer has improved on Warfield's insight

here. However, does faith terminate "on the immediate 'sight' given by God"? (p. 133). Does it not first terminate on the Scriptures themselves as testified to by the Holy Spirit, which testimony is confirmed by the unique *indicia*? Do not the Scriptures, in turn, serve as only an intermediate terminus for the faith which ultimately terminates on God and not on a "'sight' given by God"?

The trend of opinion today is against the assertion that the 1566 French edition of the *Institutes* was "carelessly translated" (p. 143).

The other chapters of the symposium are likewise helpful. David W. Kerr of Gordon Divinity School writes briefly and well on Augustine, pointing out some dangers in the Roman Catholic interpretation of the master of Hippo.

The frequently repeated error which holds that Luther did not believe the Scriptures to be inerrant is clearly rejected by J. Theodore Mueller of Concordia (St. Louis), and the evidence to the contrary presented. We wish space had permitted an expansion of the section on Luther's view of the authority and of the application of the Bible.

That Methodism "needs to take more seriously a thorough acquaintance with the written Word" (p. 159) and Calvinism needs the vitality of Methodism is a wise remark by George A. Turner of Asbury Seminary, who shows that Wesley's importance in the field of the Scriptures was not in any new discoveries but in the influence which he exerted upon others to study the Word.

The chapters which deal with more nearly contemporary theologians are forced, by the facts, to be more negative than the earlier ones. There is some question whether William Sanday deserved a place in the volume, but R. Laird Harris of Covenant Theological Seminary devotes a short section to pointing out Sanday's failure to make much of a contribution.

In the course of a discussion of H. H. Rowley, one of the leading British biblical scholars of our day, Merrill F. Unger of the Old Testament chair at Dallas Theological Seminary writes cogently on the question as to what good an inerrant original is if it no longer exists (pp. 197f.). He also has a useful passage on the change of the climate in Old Testament critical circles.

Although no chapter is consecrated to Karl Barth, there is a brilliant exposition of the views of Emil Brunner by Paul K. Jewett of Fuller Seminary. Brunner's view is set forth without criticism more clearly than the originator does it himself. When the time for a critique arrives, the reader is not left in doubt that, in spite of Brunner's changes over the years, his view of Scripture is inconsistent and untenable. Jewett is an exponent of the British art of understatement and here, as elsewhere, it is skillfully applied.

President Edward J. Carnell of Fuller Seminary writes a very sympathetic chapter on the doctrine of Scripture of Reinhold Niebuhr. He does not state his own position, and his last sentence is quite misleading.

The final survey of the situation as seen by the modern evangelical comes from the fluent pen of the editor of *Christianity Today*, Carl F. H. Henry. The evangelical, the classic liberal and the neo-orthodox (or neo-liberal, as Henry prefers) positions are summarized; then their assumptions are tested, their difficulties or inconsistencies probed, and the factors which justify the retention of the evangelical, which has been shown to be the biblical, view are marshalled. The summary is skillful and convincing. The refutation of neo-orthodoxy is particularly effective, and there is an excellent discrimination between the pagan and Christian views of inspiration (p. 975). The link between the canon and apostolic authorship seems to be drawn a little too closely (p. 274) and the rationality of evangelicalism is over-emphasized. The Christian faith is a rational one and is capable of rational defense, but it is a mistake to think that the Christian religion can be defended today by some sort of Greek or scholastic rationalism. Phrases like "the rational Creator-God" and "the rationality of the self-revealed God" (p. 261) weave a human spider-web about the God of the Bible which is useless for ensnaring anyone and lends an air of dustiness and mustiness to a faith which does not deserve it. Truth is more comprehensive than the human brain, even though the reviewer likes rationality more than probably ninety-nine per cent of his fellow humans.

This volume is an exceedingly welcome addition to evangelical literature and cannot be neglected by anyone interested in the subject.

There are relatively few misprints, about half of them being a uniform misspelling of the name of the great French scholar Doumergue.

The translation of Irenaeus at the top of page 26 is quite extraordinary, as the order of the clauses seems to follow no text known to the reviewer.

—Paul Woolley

The Inspiration and Canonicity of the Bible, by R. Laird Harris. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1957. 304 pp. \$4.50.

Biblical Criticism, by Wick Broomall. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1957. 320 pp. \$4.95.

Both of the above volumes are written from the viewpoint of a staunch faith in the plenary verbal inspiration of Scripture. As such their appearance will be greeted with joy by the conservative believer.

Dr. Harris, of Covenant Seminary, devotes approximately one third of his volume to an excellent summary presentation of the main features of the evangelical view of plenary inspiration. One is amazed how much he has been able to compress into some 100 pages, both in positive statements

and in reply to objections or difficulties. The remainder of the book deals with the thorny question of the canon, and in it the author presents the view that, both for Old and New Testaments, inspiration is the real test of canonicity. This position is not generally accepted among evangelicals, and it appears to this reviewer exposed to difficulties, which however, for lack of space, we can scarcely discuss here. Yet it is a pleasure to acknowledge that throughout the author evinces a very apt acquaintance with the labors of others and with the evidence to be marshalled. Very ample use is made of the recent discoveries near the Dead Sea. In fact, the only bibliography annexed to the book is one dealing with this subject, a rather surprising feature in a book on inspiration and canonicity in general! This work was deservedly chosen as the winner of Zondervan's Third Christian Textbook Contest.

Professor Broomall's volume deals with a broader theme and presents perhaps less original material than Dr. Harris' contribution. There is ample evidence, however, of the excellent training which the author received in the early 1920's at Princeton Theological Seminary, and his summary of the conservative positions and replies to negative criticism will no doubt be a valued help to many.

—Roger Nicole

Chemistry Magic, by Kenneth M. Swezey. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956. 180 pp. \$4.50.

In a world which depends so heavily on technology and on its foundation in theoretical science, it is a cause of dismay that the country most developed in both respects is suffering from public apathy in the training of future leaders in these areas. Such lack of interest permeates the home where the first inquiring curiosity should be developed just as it brings about the multitudinous factors behind our current deficiency in emphasis on and regard for the rigors of mathematics and the physical sciences on the secondary school level. Any college professor can bear witness to the fruits—lack of discipline in student thought, election of the easiest required science, time wasted in covering material inadequately prepared in high school, and smaller percentages of the freshman classes entering science majors. The final consequences are a subject of great concern to any thinking person. Of these the Christian should be chief, as a knowledge of God's general revelation is a mandate laid upon him by Scripture and, in inverse proportion as his fellow man fails in such knowledge, the social consequences are apparent.

Often a parent or friend of a young person does not feel adequate to guide the early steps of scientific inquiry, and the first (and subsequent) challenges are missed. However, the reviewer feels that the provision of

good and *understandable* books in any field and a measure of encouragement will develop a self-perpetuating interest. One such book should be that above. Written by a former contributor to the *Popular Science Monthly*, it follows in the fine tradition of his earlier *After-Dinner Science* and *Science Magic*. Far from a juvenile stunt book, it is a serious attempt to provide real insight and training, together with vast enjoyment, for the teen-age or older student. It provides profuse illustration, guidance in technique and safety, and a broad coverage of modern chemistry.

Surely no bright young person interested in the application of chemistry to modern life and industry could fail to be inspired. Surely even the parent or pastor who desires illustrative material for a young people's talk can find much here for ingenious use. And finally, surely some boy or girl might find his or her steps led toward a career in science or an allied field where the Christian understanding and ethic is so sorely needed in our day.

—*Thomas H. Leith*

Helping the Bible Speak, by Johnnye Akin, Seth Fessenden, P. Merville Larson, and Albert N. Williams. New York: Association Press, 1956. 117 pp. \$2.50.

Woolbert and Nelson, in their text, *Art of Interpretative Reading*, make the following observation:

Every preacher at every service has a chance to deliver two telling sermons; one superlatively good, whatever the other may prove to be, because from a superlatively good source—the Scriptures. . . . Any preacher who can read the Scriptures with intelligent and vivacious interpretation can preach a sermon which perhaps will be the better of the two delivered at that service.

The aim of the authors of this book—three of them are speech teachers and the fourth a religious editor—is to help not only the preacher but all interested in the oral reading of Scripture to preach that second sermon effectively. Using the analogy of a symphony the authors deal with pitch and tone quality, volume and projection, rate and rhythm, and imagery and emotion. Their suggestions, using apt Scripture passages, are in keeping with the best texts in the field of oral interpretation.

This book, though simply written, is not one of those "How to be a Success in One Week" texts. To master the techniques presented will take time, but for Christian leaders, and evangelicals especially, it would be time well spent.

The first three chapters of the book are, from the evangelical standpoint, disappointing at times. They should not, however, distract anyone interested in the oral communication of God's Word from finding in this book a great deal of help.

—*W. R. Kershaw*

Elementary Hebrew, by E. Leslie Carlson. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1956. iii and 274 pp. \$3.50.

The perennial argument as to whether it is better to teach Hebrew by an inductive or a deductive method will not be settled by this new grammar of Hebrew. Each teacher will no doubt continue to do that which is right in his own eyes.

The author prefers to call his method a modified inductive one. For those who do not care for this method some of the modifications will appear to be definite improvements. Each reading lesson is followed by a grammar lesson and at intervals there are exercises of translation from English into Hebrew. Opportunities for review are given in every third lesson, which should allow the student to catch his breath.

One very helpful feature is the printing of the English transliteration of the Hebrew text during the first few lessons. It is likely, however, that some time could be saved and still more confusion avoided by taking time to have the class learn to read Hebrew without translating it.

It hardly seems necessary to trouble the student of elementary Hebrew with all twenty-six of the Hebrew accents (20-21).

The program of covering the first fourteen chapters of Genesis in four quarters seems a bit ambitious although it has no doubt proven feasible to the author, who has a long teaching experience. This book could prove to be one of the more practical attempts in recent years to present Hebrew as the simple and interesting language that it is.

—David W. Kerr

When the Time Had Fully Come, by Herman N. Ridderbos. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1957. 104 pp. \$1.50.

The present volume is the second to appear in English by the able professor of New Testament at the Kampen Theological Seminary in The Netherlands. His first contribution, *Galatians*, appeared in the *New International Commentary*. This present work is the third in the series of Pathway Books, a new project to give evangelical scholars an opportunity to express themselves on problems which have recently absorbed the attention of the Christian Church.

The title of this book is perhaps not as suggestive of its contents as the sub-title, *Studies in New Testament Theology*. The writing actually deals with five distinct problems which, however, when studied under the impact of the historical advent of Christ and "The Eschaton," are helpfully illuminated and to a larger extent clarified.

The first essay, "The Kingdom of God According to the Witness of the Synoptic Gospels," serves to set the pattern for the book. In this concise statement, only 26 pages long, appears one of the clearest expositions

that this reviewer has been privileged to read in some time. Bultmann, Schweitzer and Dodd are examined and set aside in favor of the author's own position. It would be completely erroneous to conclude by this that the author is merely negative in his approach. Rather, he accepts those contributions which have merit without falling into the opposite fallacy of becoming a mere synthesizer. As a result, he has something to say which deserves to be heard. Assuredly, some will feel that he has absorbed too much; others will conclude that he has received too little. More will feel that he has comported himself well in a difficult but nonetheless important area.

The second essay entitled "The Significance of the Sermon on the Mount" is concerned with the radical demands of Christ upon His followers. The author rightly rejects the view that the sermon has meaning primarily for the second advent (Dispensationalism), or that it governs only those relationships within the church (Reformed), or that it has only to do with one's private life as distinct from one's public and official life (Luther), or that these commands are limited to a particular group such as the apostles or clergy (Catholic). Rather, he proposes that these demands must be understood in the light of the cross of Jesus. In their radicalism there are hidden the signs of Jesus' own love, which he desires the disciples to understand, as in the imperative, "Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me." It is this fundamental devotional and sacrificial love which in the sermon calls forth sacrifice, not only as a gift which we on our part and in our own power may return, but as a capacity, a possibility which He himself established in our lives through His love.

In "The Redemptive-Historical Character of Paul's Preaching" the author joins the attempt of other scholars to find that approach to Paul's thinking which will prove more adequate for interpreting and understanding the whole of his thought. Rejecting those Reformers who limited their approach too exclusively to Paul's forensic justification by faith, Ridderbos also rejects the later pietistic and mystical approach which sought to explain Paul via his "In-Christ" concept. Rather he turns to the new *Heilsgeschichtlich* (redemptive-historical) approach which offers a new and broadened outlook on the general character of Paul's preaching. He finds that "The Spirit," "In-Christ" and "The Lord" are all experiences to be understood in the light of "The Eschaton." They are not mystical expressions, nor do they stand in contradiction to the forensic approach of Paul; rather, they belong to the redemptive-historical category. "The Law of God in Paul's Doctrine of Salvation" offers an abbreviated but very helpful correction to Nygren. The volume concludes with "The History of Redemption and the Scripture of the New Testament." This chapter on the authority of Scripture, though on the whole very constructive and helpful, is most

likely to draw some fire. One statement in particular needs some clarification. With reference to the gospel writers he says, "They do not claim to give an accurate and continuous report of the history of Jesus, but to show in what way the Kingdom of God had come in Him."

—Glenn Barker

Israel and the Aramaeans of Damascus, by Merrill F. Unger. London: James Clarke and Co., 1957. 189 pp. 21 shillings.

Israel and the Aramaeans of Damascus, an Evangelical Theological Society publication by the professor at Dallas Theological Seminary, is an exhaustive piece of research into the origin, development, and importance of the ancient biblical city of Damascus in its earlier and later phases. The work constitutes Unger's dissertation for the doctorate at Johns Hopkins University.

A panoramic view, based upon recent archaeological discoveries, of the lore, lure, and legend of Damascus is presented in this volume. The complex linguistic riddle of the etymology of the name "Damascus" receives rather extensive treatment. The historical vicissitudes of the city in the Patriarchal period, under Egyptian control, as a center of Aramaean power under Hebrew control, and as a rival of Israel are delineated.

Some of the more vexing problems of the relationship of the kings of Israel and Judah (particularly Omri, Ahab, Joash, and Benhadad I and II) should be of interest to all biblical students.

The role of Assyria and Egypt as threats to the domination and very existence of Syria and the northern and southern kingdoms of Israel-Judah is rather fully treated.

Extensive notations and documentation follow the main corpus of the text.

This is recommended as a work of high scholarship in the conservative cause.

—John Gates

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

THOMAS H. LEITH

Advancement of Science. In June there are discussions on the economic effects of automation and on science as a part of general education. In September Hawkes writes on "Archaeology as Science: Purposes and Pitfalls."

American Association of University Professors Bulletin. J. P. Lewis and others write on "Needs, Resources, and Priorities in Higher Educational Planning" in September.

American Scholar. In the Autumn number there is a symposium on "Faiths For a Complex World" and a brief note on relativism by Joseph Wood Krutch.

Asbury Seminarian. Articles on existentialism, Paul Tillich, and Kierkegaard in the Summer number.

Atlantic Monthly for September has articles on Billy Graham, nonconformity, and the death penalty. In October there is a fine series on science and industry dealing with such items as evolution, satellites, relativity, flight, and natural resources.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, May. G. S. Watts, "The Thomist Proofs of Theism."

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June. Max Born writes on his views of the development of varied atomic bombs and their use.

Canadian Journal of Theology. In April there are articles on the church and tradition.

Catholic Biblical Quarterly, July. An article on "Luke 1: 34 and Mary's Virginity."

Christian Scholar, September. Articles on the Christian and legal principles.

Christianity Today, August 19. Symposium on "The Body Christ Heads."

Church History in September has L. H. Zuck on "Anabaptism: Abortive Counter-Revolt Within the Reformation."

Concordia Theological Monthly, July. C. S. Meyer, "Friction Points in Church-State Relations in the U. S."

Confluence, Summer. A whole issue on Education Today and its problems around the world.

Diogenes, No. 19. "Early Christianity: Arts and Soul," by C. Bell.

Dublin Review, Summer. An evaluation of existentialism.

Etc., Spring. E. C. Kelley, "The Significance of Being Unique."

Eternity. In August there are articles on "Is Your Singing Biblical?" by R. McNeely and by Ramm on "Bultmann's Theological Dust Storm." C. P. Wagner discusses the origin of life and P. R. Edwards writes on fundamentalist infallibility in September. In October there is an article on the religious motivations of Columbus and in November D. G. Barnhouse writes a postscript on Seventh Day Adventism.

Ethics in July has N. Riemer on "Some Reflections on the Grand Inquisitor and Modern Democratic Theory."

Etudes Philosophiques, July-September. A large issue with 105 articles on the broad subject of man and his works—particularly in esthetics, science, and philosophy.

Etudes Evangéliques, April-June. C. A. van Peursen, "Les Grands Courants de la Philosophie Contemporaine."

Expository Times in July has "Changing Attitudes to Religion in Contemporary English Philosophy" by J. Macquarrie.

Harper's in September has L. L. Jaffe, "The Scandal of TV Licensing" and in October has D. Colville, "British and American Schools."

Harvard Educational Review, Winter. A. Bestor, "The Education Really Needed for a Changing World."

Harvard Theological Review, January. E. Ehnmark, "Transmigration in Plato."

Hibbert Journal, October. Articles on science and Christian belief, on Bunyan, and on Joseph Conrad.

His, October. Gordon Clark, "The Christian and the Law" and H. Rohrbach, "Modern Science and Christian Faith." Paul Jewett writes on "Emil Brunner's Social Ethics" and Kenneth Pike writes on "Why I Believe in God" in November.

Interpretation, July. C. G. Howie, "British Israelism and Pyramidology."

Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation. In June there is a series on parapsychology and in September G. E. Ladd writes, "Revelation, History, and the Bible."

Journal of Asian Studies, August. M. Srinivas discusses caste in modern India.

Journal of Chemical Education, October. S. W. Fox, "The Chemical Problem of Spontaneous Generation."

Journal of Geology. The September issue has an article by R. Yalkovsky on determining temperature changes in the past from deep-sea cores and on dating them.

Journal of the History of Ideas, October. C. H. George, "English Calvinist Opinion on Usury, 1600-1640."

Journal of Pastoral Care. In the fall, L. Salzman writes, "Spiritual and Faith Healing."

Journal of Philosophy. The issue of August 1 contains a number of articles on free will.

Journal of Religion, July. Two articles on Bultmann's demythologization.

Main Currents. In September H. Margenau discusses "The Modern Predicament."

Moody Monthly, August. Wilbur Smith writes, "Suggestions for the Study of a Given Biblical Passage."

Natural History, October. Two articles on early man in America.

Nature, September 7. Julian Huxley, "Three Types of Evolutionary Process."

New Republic, July 29. David Riesman, "The Supreme Court and its Critics." On Aug. 26 Reinhold Niebuhr discusses capital punishment.

Newsletter of Religious Inquiry. In October, J. H. Shrader has "Prayer: Factual Data, Rationale, Validation."

Partisan Review, Summer. Ursula Brumm, "The Christ Figure in American Writing."

Pastoral Psychology in October has "Religion in Psychotherapy" by N. C. Morgan.

Personalist for Spring has W. H. Werkmeister on "History and Human Destiny."

Philosophical Quarterly, July. "Ethical Intuitionism—A Restatement" by O. A. Johnson.

Philosophical Review, October. P. Foot, "Free Will as Involving Determinism."

Philosophy in July has three articles on belief in God, two on contemporary philosophy and religion, and a discussion on thinking and machines.

Physics Today, October. P. W. Bridgman, "Some of the Broader Implications of Science."

Political Science Quarterly includes "Philosophy and History" by C. Frankel.

Practical Anthropology. In May-June Eugene Nida writes an excellent article on Mariology in Latin America and in July-August on the role of language in contemporary Africa.

Religion in Life for Autumn has a symposium on religion in higher education, particularly as related to physical science, history, and sociology.

Religious Education, July-August. A symposium on religion and public education. In September-October there are articles on the contribution of psychiatry and physics to theology.

Reporter. On July 11 there is a fine article on modern Israel. On Sept. 5 there are three articles on the civil rights bill. On Nov. 14 we have a discussion on "Russia: The Scientific Elite."

Review and Expositor, July. G. M. Bryan, "Realistic Christian Ethics."

Saturday Review. In September and October there are articles on "Why Don't the Scientists Admit They're Human?", on "The Religious Outlook" by Julian Huxley, on the morality of space, and a debate on modern poetry.

Scientific American for October has articles on the Sumerians and on metropolitan segregation. In November an important new Neanderthal find—the Shanidar cave—is discussed.

Scientific Monthly in August has a reappraisal symposium on American foreign aid and an article on the social responsibility of the physician, in September has "World Population in Relation to Potential Food Supply" by W. Leonard, and in November A. Knopf on "Measuring Geological Time."

Seminary Review, Winter. "The Teaching of Jesus Concerning Hell."

Theology for July has "Divorce and Christian Teaching."

Theology Today has a symposium on racial segregation and the church and an article on deeper levels of Christian Ethics in July.

Thomist, July. J. J. Sikora, "Philosophy of Nature and Natural Science From a Thomist Viewpoint."

Torch and Trumpet, July-August. J. Heerema, "The Great Barrier Between Man and Animal."

Union Seminary Quarterly Review in March has an article on Kierkegaard and theology: the May issue has a symposium on religion and mass media, church music, and drama. There is also a discussion of Bultmann's existential approach to theology.

University of Toronto Quarterly for July has an article on American foreign policy, one on the university and business, and one on the future of evolution. In October, John Wild writes, "Existentialism: A New View of Man."

World Dominion in July has Meir on whether the Sunday Schools are out of date.

Of additional interest to this reviewer were the chapters in Grossman and Farrell, *The Heart of Jazz* (New York University Press, 1956) on the Christian element in New Orleans jazz. Also of import is a new series of papers entitled the *Doorway Papers* published by A. C. Custance, Box 165, Station D, Ottawa, Canada on a great variety of subjects in the relation of science to Scripture. One may not agree with all that is here but the papers are at least invaluable and unique reference sources.

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